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In a democracy with a strong tradition of freedom of the press, the 
imposition of censorship as a wartime necessity is rarely 
accomplished without considerable difficulty in its execution and in 
the definition of its limits. 
In Canada during the Second World War, the difficulty of 
controlling the flow of news in the interests of the war effort was 
compounded because the French-Canadians were in general 
unenthusiastic about their country's participation in a war which 
many regarded as none of Canada's business. The imposition of 
censorship had to take into account not only the general curtailment 
of freedom of expression, but also the sensitivities of that part of the 
population which had previously shown its reluctance to accept 
coercive or restrictive measures during the First World War.' 
Although press censorship remained a controversial issue in 
Canada for the duration of the war, the most intense opposition to it 
was manifested in 1940, not merely because the precipitating cause 
was controversial in itself, but because it highlighted the most 
divisive domestic issue in the country, the different perception of 
national goals and purposes maintained by Canada's two 'founding 
peoples.' It was over an issue arising from the imposition of press 
censorship that this major cleavage revealed itself for the first, but 
not the last time in Canada. 
Censorship was accepted as an unpleasant, but unavoidable 
necessity by most of Canada's newspapers when war broke out in 
1939. As Canada's leading daily newspaper, the Toronto Globe and 
Mailstated, 'Freedom of speech must be curtailed when the nation is . 
at war. What use of fighting an enemy without if the enemies within 
are given a free hand?'2 If the censorship imposed on the press was 
accepted initially with little opposition from newsmen, it was due at 
least in part to the fact that the censors were themselves drawn from 
the ranks of journalism, and were presumed to understand the 
temperament of journalists and the demands of their profession. This 
is not to say that censorship was imposed on the press without 
friction, or that all newspapers managed to avoid clashes with the 
censors. Several newspapers were fined for violation of censorship 
regulations during the war, but none became popular martyrs to the 
cause of freedom of the p r e s 3  Criticism of the censors was muted 
not only by the newspapers' agreement on the necessity of 
censorship, but also by their realization that ill-judged actions by the 
censors were due more to ignorance in the face of novel 
circumstances than any malicious desire to stifle the press. 
The problem of imposing censorship on the press in the event of 
war had occupied pre-war governments in desultory fashion for 
almost a decade before the outbreak of the ~ o n f l i c t . ~  Despite the 
pleas of military authorities for greater government initiative in 
planning for war, secretary to the Chiefs of Staff Committee 'during 
the years 1934-37, apart from some work we did in National Defence 
on censorship, the governmental machine, in this respect, appeared 
stolidly to stand at dead ~en t r e . ' ~  In 1936, Dr. E.H. Coleman, the 
under-secretary of State, was asked to discuss the question of future 
censorship with representatives of the newspapers, and the Canadian 
Press wire service was asked to recommend personnel to staff the 
offices of the official censorship in time of war. A list of suitable 
names was provided to the government less than two weeks before 
hostilities began.6 A growing sense of urgency on the part of the 
government, however, may be seen in the formation of an 
interdepartmental committee to deal with the subject of wartime 
censorship, in March, 1938.' 
When war broke out in Europe, the press of Canada was subject to 
censorship under two different sets of regulations. The censorship 
regulations brought into force on 1.September 1939 had been drawn 
up by Colonel Pope at National Defence Headquarters8 and were 
based on regulations drafted by the Committee of Imperial Defence 
for use in the United Kingdom and the E m ~ i r e . ~  Complaints of the 
severity of these regulations by editors and reporters led to their 
revocation the following January.lo 
The permanent foundations of press censorship for the 
remainder of the war were the Defence of Canada Regulations 
established by order in council 3 September 1939, under the 
legislative authority of the War Measures Act." The pertinent 
sections of the DOCR, while outlining the limitations on the material 
to be published by the press, did not specify the procedures to be used 
in carrying out the business of cens~rship. '~ It was not until 13 
August 1942 that the chief censor of publications had a clear 
definition of his powers - which were limited to declaring that 
publication of a certain piece of information was not a violation of 
the DOCR.I3 The censor had no power to punish errant publications: 
decision on whether or not a newspaper or magazine had violated the 
regulations was to be left to the courts. 
For the first year of the war, the mechanism of censorship was an 
administrative mare's nest. Walter Thompson, publicity director for 
the Canadian National Railways, was named chief censor for 
Canada, and a Censorship Co-ordination Committee was set up with 
Thompson as its head.14 Separate press censors were appointed to 
examine English and French-language publications. Headquarters 
were in Ottawa, with a branch office in Montreal dealing mainly with 
French-language publications, and regional offices were established 
in Halifax, Toronto and Vanco~ver. '~  A proposal that a censor 
should be placed directly in the press gallery on Parliament Hill was 
quickly rejected.16 All overseas publications entering Canada, except 
for newspapers, were examined by the chief postal censor. For 
Canadian publications in languages other than English or French, a 
special publications examination branch was established.I7 
From the outset, it was decided that the censors should be 
experienced newsmen, acceptable to the press in their respective 
regions. At the local level, the system worked satisfactorily: at the 
centre, however, there was considerable confusion over the authority 
and responsibilities of the censors. The Censorship Co-ordination 
Committee designated as the overall authority for the entire range of 
censorship activities met only once in that first year of war, and then 
only to consider a report made by Colonel Pope to  the pre-war 
interdepartmental committee on cen~orship. '~ When Walter 
Thompson left for the Directorate of Public Information in 
December, 1939, Colonel Pope becamede facto(and absentee) headof 
censorship until May, 1942, when Colonel Oliver Mowat Biggar took 
over the post and brought some system of order into the 
administrative tangle of censorship. Biggar remained in office until 
January, 1944, when ill-health forced him to hand over his 
responsibilities to  Wilfred Eggleston, who had been chiefpresscensor 
for English-language publications since early 1940.19 
The Defence of Canada Regulations provided an initial, and very 
broad, outline of censorship requirements and duties. During the six 
years of war, the censors explained and expanded on the Regulations 
by means of some 200 directives issued to editors and publishers. 
Depending on the urgency of the case, directives were sent by mail, or 
by telegram followed by an explanatory letter. Because such 
directives often became obsolete through the changing 
circumstances of the war, there were ususally no more than 25 or 30 
in effect at any given time.20 To keep editors abreast of the 
Regulations and their interpretations, the censors issued nine 
successive editions of the revised directives during the war. 
Only one of the more than 100 daily newspapers published in 
Canada was suspended from publicaltion: the Toronto Clarion, a 
communist newspaper, was forced to cease publication in 
November, 1939.2' Eleven weekly and monthly foreign language 
publications were banned, mainly because they published 
communist propaganda, or opposed Canada's war effort. These 
usually reappeared under different names and were left undisturbed 
after the Soviet Union's entry in the war. Several newspapers were 
taken to court and fined for violations of the censorship regulations, 
but the penalties were light. The Vancouver Sun was fined $300 in 
1942 for printing articles on West Coast defences after the Japanese 
attack on Pearl Harbor, Le Droir of Ottawa was fined $300 for an 
article critical of an Allied bombing raid on Paris, and Le Soleil of the 
Quebec City was fined $60 for premature disclosure of the sinking of 
an American steamer in December, 1944.22 
One of the major problems faced by the Canadian censors during 
the first two years of the war lay in the fact that the United States was 
still neutral and the outpourings of its news media were not subject to 
wartime restrictions. As the first chief censor pointed out, trying to 
insulate Canada from propaganda sources in the United States was 
like trying to heat a Canadian house in winter if it had only three 
walls.23 There was nothing to prevent Axis information agencies 
reaching Canadian ears through American radio stations, even if it 
were possible to ban American publications from Canada outright, 
or place severe restrictions on cross-border travel by Canadians. To 
try to censor all incoming US publications would have been self- 
defeating: such action would have generated a publicity momentum 
of its own. There were, on occasion, objections to material in popular 
American magazines which might be construed as harmful to the 
Canadian war effort, or to national unity." Public demands for the 
banning of these publications were resisted by thecensors,as occurred 
when the American economist, Eliot Janeway remarked in an article 
in Life magazine that the Canadian government was being 
'blackmailed by the crudely pro-Axis French-Canadian minority (an 
ideal Nazi fifth-column).'25 
The chief censor for English-language publications commented: 
Suppose this paragraph, or the page containing it, had 
been excised from all issues of Life magazine entering 
Canada. Would that have kept it out?No, because thevery 
act of excision would have made the paragraph a juicy 
news item for the American press. The Associated Press, 
the United Press, and the International News Service 
would have sent out an item to theeffect that the Canadian 
censors had held up all shipments of Life long enough to 
delete a paragraph by Eliot Janeway, and it is safe to 
assume that all three services would have quoted the 
offending paragraph verbatim, by way of illustration. 
Canadian newspapers would have reported the holding up 
of the issues but, to be consistent, would have refrained 
from reproducing the offending paragraph. But would 
this self-denial have prevented Canadians from reading 
the paragraph? Far from it. The United States news and 
radio stations would have supplied the paragraph to the 
New York Times, the Herald-Tribune, the Mirror, and the 
News, the Detroit, Buffalo and Seattle papers, and to all 
those radio stations to which Canadians regularly 
listen.. .we should find for every original paragraph we had 
scissored out, ten or fifty new ones had sprung up in its 
place.26 
Censorship over foreign news was made easier by the Canadian 
Press wire service's near-monopoly on news from overseas. CP had 
been involved in the pre-war discussions of the government's 
interdepartmental committee on censorship2' and had already shown 
its ability to shield Canadians from overseas news during the 
abdication crisis in 1936: Canada's wire servicesent out no despatches 
on the story to its subscribing newspapers, right up to the day of the 
king's radio broadcast announcing his abdication - nor did it send 
out any of the American Associated Press cables to which it was 
entitled by reciprocal agreement with AP.28 
The Canadian Press took pains throughout the war to ensure that 
incoming news copy from foreign sources complied with the 
censorship  regulation^.^^ Sensitive material was transmitted over the 
CP wire with the "slug" Holdfor CensorApproval. If approved by the 
censor, a message would be sent on the wire, authorizing member 
newspapers to run the story. If it was not approved, a "kill-note" was 
sent out to the teletypes. The wire services of the United States co- 
operated with the self-censorship of CP. Most of CP's foreign news 
came through the despatches of Associated Press correspondents and 
these, of course, were examined by CP before they went on the wire. 
However, many Canadian newspapers subscribed independently to 
other wire services, such as the International News Service, and the 
Chicago Daily News and the New York Times wire services. Their 
reports were fed directly to Canadian newspapers without scrutiny by 
an intermediate agency such as CP. These services, apprized of the 
Canadian censorship regulations, would slug doubtful stories Not for 
Publication in Canada.30 
It wan inevitable, given the natural distaste of newsmen for 
restrictions on their work, that there would be loudcomplaints about 
the operations of the censors, even if censorship itself were 
recognized as necessary in a society at  war with a ruthless and 
implacable enemy. In the confusion of the first year of the war, 
almost any action on the part of the censor could be criticized as 
heavy-handed and there were incidents in which the censor's 
decisions were, to put it charitably, inept. It is not easy for a 
democracy's press suddenly to deny its basic function and practice 
the arts of concealment at  the command of government. There were 
occasions when the men at the top had little regard for the censorship 
which they claimed was indispensable to the winning of the war, and 
censorship rulings often flew in the face of military or  bureaucratic 
' inflexibility. Editors frequently complained of the ban on reporting 
troop movements, and the complaints came to a head when not even 
the Canadian government could maintain secrecy about the arrival 
of the Canadian First Division in Britain on 17 December 1939. The 
government had agreed to hold up announcement of the division's 
arrival for two days at the request of the Admiralty, and had notified 
the press accordingly. Both newsmen and cabinet ministers were 
taken aback when Winston Churchill broadcast the news on the day 
of the arrival." 
The major cause celebre of Canadian press censorship in the war 
was the arrest and internment of Montreal's ebullient mayor, 
Camillien Houde, for counselling resistance to national registration. 
The arrest of the mayor led to the most serious criticism of the 
censors during the war, and served painfully to define their role as 
watchdogs of the press. 
On 21 June 1940, parliament passed the National Resources 
Mobilization Act. Although it gave the government extensive 
authority to direct manpower as it saw fit, the Act contained the 
reservation that such authority could not be used 'for the purpose of 
requiring persons to serve in the military, naval o r  air forces outside 
of Canada and the territorial waters t he re~f . "~  In Quebec, however, 
many were unconvinced by this reassurance and saw the NRMA as 
the first crack in the federal government's solid pledge to avoid the 
imposition of conscription for overseas service. Among the doubters 
was Camillien Houde, who objected strongly to the use of Montreal 
municipal office buildings as centres for the registration of citizens 
under the NRMA. On 2 August, Mayor Houde made a public 
declaration of his opposition to national registration: 
I declare myself peremptorily against national 
registration. It is unequivocally a measure of 
conscription, and the government recently elected last 
March, declaired through the mouths of all its political 
chieftains, from Prime Minister Mackenzie King to 
Premier Adelard Godbout of Quebec ... that there would 
be no conscription under any form whatsoever ... Parlia- 
ment, according to my belief, has no mandate to vote 
conscription. I do not myself believe that I am held to 
conform to the said law, and I have no intention of so 
doing, and I ask the population not to conform, knowing 
full well what I am doing presently and to what I expose 
myself. If the government wants a mandate for 
conscription, let it come before the people, without this 
time fooling them.33 
The events of the following week showed clearly both the 
anomalous position of the censors in a society accustomed to a free 
press, and the extreme caution with which the Liberal Prime 
Minister, Mackenzie King, had to pursue war policies which could 
never command the united support of the nation. While many 
Quebeckers volunteered for war service, the prevailing sentiment in 
the province remained much more isolationist than that in the 
English-speaking provinces. The conviction that Quebec had little or 
no vital interest in a European war had many articulate spokesmen, 
of whom Mayor Houde was one of the most prominent. 
On the night of 5 August, Houde was arrested on a warrant signed 
by Ernest Lapointe, the federal minister of justice, and was sent to an 
internment camp, where he remained until August, 1944. In prime 
minister King's words the cabinet 
were virtually agreed that action be taken against Houde, 
and that immediately. The advisers in the Justice 
Department suggested Provincial Government taking 
action. Cardin rightly said 'Why should we place the 
burden on the Provincial Government? Why not the 
Federal Government? I asked him, in what manner, and 
he said by the R.C.M.P. He said action should be taken at 
once. Council then discussed whether Houde should be 
interned, or dealt with by the courts. It was agreed that, if 
brought before court, he would be given the opportunity 
he wanted, namely, speechify, making a display, etc. It 
was felt if he were interned at once, that would deprive 
him of this opportunity and would be most helpful in 
the end. It was agreed that the Mounted Police should 
take this action forthwith. 
It was thought it had better be at night, as there would be 
no opportunity for photograph displays, etc. I can see, in 
the whole business, possibility of riots and serious 
difficulties throughout the Province of Quebec. 
However, I see no other course. The federal Government 
cannot afford to have its laws defied by one of Mayor 
Houde's p r~minence .~~  
Meanwhile, Houde's defiance of the government had created vast 
confusion in the offices of the censors. Shortly after Houde issued 
copies of his statement to the press, the chief censor issued a ruling 
that publishing the Mayor's remarks 'will probably constitute an 
offence under the Defence of Canada Reg~lations.'~~ The ruling 
came too late for the statement to be withdrawn from the 3 August 
first editions of the Montreal Gazette and the Toronto Globe and 
Mail, both of which ran stories on Mayor Houde and his statement on 
their front pages. From that moment both the newspapers and 
the censor found that their actions were public issues. Official wrath 
fell mainly on the Gazette, whose publisher, John Bassett, made a 
direct appeal to the appropriate cabinet ministers to permit him to 
publish the statement after it was withdrawn from later editions of 
his newspaper. 
The first word received by the Gazette on the censor's policy in the 
matter came shortly after 9 p.m. on Friday, 2 August, as the presses . 
were rolling with the first edition of next day's newspaper. The 
censor's office telephoned the Gazette to say that exception had been 
taken to Mayor Houde's statement, and advised the newspaper not 
to run any stories on the Mayor's action.36 The Gazette agreed to 
remove the offending material from later editions. Bassett then called 
the minister of national defence, who referred him to the secretary of 
state, the minister with authority over the censor." The policy of 
suppressing Houde's statement was upheld. No written statement of 
the censor's policy was received until after midnight, by which time 
the Canadian Press had sent out the story of the censor's ban on the 
Houde statement to its subscribers'  teletype^.^' 
The following morning, Bassett called R. B. Hanson, the Leader of 
the Official Opposition, and read Houde's statement to him over the 
telephone.3g In the House that morning, Hanson repeated the 
statement, made reference to the censor's action, and asked the 
Prime Minister 'Is there any longer a free press in CanadaT40 A 
government member's attempt to prevent publication of Hanson's 
remarks was unsuccessful: King was, in any case, not prepared to 
complicate the issue by interferingwith House records.41 The censor 
then sent a telegram to the newspapers: 'Our restriction Houde 
incident does not include House of Commons debate which may be 
freely quoted by ASK editors confine themselves to such statements 
in the ~ o u s e . " ~  
Hanson's raising of the issue in the House took place too late for it 
to appear in most Canadian newspapers, which ran the story on the 
following Monday. The wire services, however, quickly flashed the 
story across the North American continent, and to Great Britain, 
where it was front-page news.43 As any journalist could have 
foretold, once a news story becomes public property, even for a 
moment, there is no stopping its further publication wherever 
newsmen detect sensation or  scandal. 
When parliament met on Monday, the Prime Minister scolded 
Hanson for repeating Houde's statement and criticized the press for 
giving the publicity the Mayor wanted: 'I think that when it was made 
any newspaper office that had seen it ought to have prevented its 
publication. Certainly, I think it was quite correct that the censor 
should ask that the statement be ~ensored.'~' 
With editorial reaction against the Censor rapidly mounting, the 
61st censorship directive of the war was sent out to clarify the official 
position. A paraphrase of it was sent out over the CP wires: 
'Confidential - Not for Publication. Re. Houde: Editors may safely 
report factual development and carry editorial and outside cdmment 
provided offensive material is neither reproduced nor defended. 
Editors asked to refrain from material likely to aggravate harmful 
controversy between groups in Canada.'45 
The overriding consideration in the minds of both government and 
censor was the avoidance of anything which might turn French- 
Canadian opinion against the war effort, and in particular against 
the National Resources Mobilization Act. It was one of the Prime 
Minister's distracting fears that Houde's arrest might give rise to 
serious civil disturbance in Quebec, and was the major consideration 
in arresting the Mayor in as secretive a manner as possible. In 
addition, King felt that the airing of the issue in the House of 
Commons was 'calculated to make trouble between the Government 
and the press, also to stir up trouble in Quebec.'46 
The arrest of Houde did not immediately make him a martyr for 
Quebec's opposition to conscription, although it would not be long 
before he was considered so. French-language newspapers on the 
whole were quick to condemn his defiance of the federal 
g~vernment.~'  L'Illustration Nouvelle went so far as to call him a 
political hoodlum and even the strongly nationaliste newspaper, Le 
Devoir, which was certainly no friend of the government or of the war 
effort, considered Houde to have overstepped the mark and to have 
, deserved his fate.48 English-language newspapers were unanimous in 
their condemnation of the Mayor. With equal unanimity, they 
rounded on the censors with a chorus of abuse, piling the scorn with 
admirable impartiality on the chiefs of the English and French 
censorship alike. The most stinging criticism came from the Ottawa 
Citizen in an editorial implying that the censors were traitors to their 
former profession: 
- 
Montreal's supreme demagogue, Mayor 
Houde, has received far more free publicity by 
the action of the press censors in Ottawa than 
would have been likely without press 
censorship ... 
... in recent months the Canadian newpapers 
have been taking instuctions from Messrs. 
Eggleston and Charpentier. Known to fame as 
former members of the press gallery on 
Parliament Hill, they have been trying to carry 
ut the will of Prime Minister Mackenzie King - 
including guidance to the Canadian press on 
editorial pol i~y. '~ 
The Globe and Mail pointed out that inflammatory statements by 
prominent French-Canadians had not exactly been unknown during 
the First World War, and had not been subject to a censor's ban: 
Such statements as that of the Mayor of Montreal were 
published throughout Canada during the Great War 
without interference by the press censors and it would be 
interesting to learn whether suppression of Mayor 
Houde's statement was ordered for political or  military 
reasons. Since His Worship's outburst cannot be of the 
slightest assistance to the enemy, one is forced to the 
conclusion that the censor's decision was dictated by a 
foolish desire to protect the party in power. If a censor 
can thus muzzle the press, why cannot he go into the 
House of Commons and gag the Leader of the 
OppositionPo 
The Montreal Gazette, which had borne the greater burden of 
censorial disapproval, hit back at  the censor on 5 August: 
The Gazette was right in this instance and the censor 
hopelessly wrong. .. .Moreover the censor has succeeded 
only in defeating his own purpose. The news which he 
sought to suppress could not be and has not been 
suppressed. The public demand for it has been whetted, 
and the whole matter has become the subject of 
Parliamentary debate. 
What we have had is a striking illustration of wrong 
and blundering action on the part of an official imbued 
with the concept of a totalitarian arbiter." 
On the following day, the Gazette furnished its readers with a 
comprehensive account of the events a t  the newspaper on the night of 
2 August. In reply to the Prime Minister's claim that 'Any newspaper 
office that had seen it (the Houde statement) ought to have prevented 
its publication,' the Gazette protested: 
This statement is strikingly illustrative of the handicaps 
newspapers are facing under the present censorship 
administration. At the present moment the Gazette has 
never received, from any one at  any time, positive orders 
not t o  print the Houde story o r  comment thereupon. As 
for the Prime Minister's belief 'any newspaper office' 
should have suppressed the story on its own initiative, 
suffice it to  say that this opinion was not shared by either 
the Gazette or  the Globe and Mail, the only Canadian 
newspaper offices affected on Friday evening. The 
Gazette believed on Friday night, and it continues to 
believe, that publication of the story was in the public 
interest, and that no valid reason existed for its 
s u p p r e s s i ~ n . ~ ~  
For the first few days of the second week in August, editorial 
writers continued to make life miserable for the censors, accusing 
them of toadying to the government in a situation where truth and 
journalistic integrity were at stake.53 On 7 August, the chief censor 
explained his actions in a letter to the Canadian Press. The censor's 
duty, he pointed out, was to prevent the dissemination of statements 
and opinions which would exacerbate tensions between French- and 
English-Canadians. In the case of Carnillien Houde, he said, 'I am 
satisfied we were right in attempting to  prevent general circulation of 
Houde's appeal against registration until such time as the 
Government had been able to act. There is no doubt in my mind that 
if we had taken no steps about it, it would have been used in certain 
parts of Quebec to  work up resistance t o  registration, and a great deal 
of harm might have been done....'54 
Clearly, the censor's critics in the press had forgotten that he was 
no longer a newsman, but a civil servant charged with carrying out 
public policy, not criticizing it. As the Prime Minister noted in his 
diary, Mayor Houde's defiance of the federal government caused 
him 'more concern than anything which has happened thus far.'55 
With the spectre of Canada's conscription crisis of 1917 before him, 
Mackenzie King had to  describe a very wary path through the 
minefield of French-Canadian sensibilities. In particular, the 
drafting of the National Resources Mobilization Bill in the summer 
of 1940 had involved him in an extensive campaign of sounding out 
French-Canadian opinion and employing his cabinet colleagues 
from Quebec to persuade their people that the measure posed no 
threat of conscription for overseas ser~ice.'~ 
It was in pursuit of this policy of maintaining French-Canadian 
support for the war that the censor had earlier that summer warned 
newspapers against printing material which might cause friction 
between English- and French-Canadians when the Royal Navy 
attacked French warships in their North African bases5' Shortly 
after Houde's arrest, the censor barred re-publication of material 
which had already been widely circulated eighteen months earlier: 
this was a speech made by the Mayor to a YMCA group in February 
1939. In the course of his speech, Houde said: 
You appear to be surprised when I say the sympathies of 
the French-Canadian would be with Italy in the event of a 
war between that country and England. I would ask you 
to remember that the great majority of French- 
Canadians are Roman Catholic and the Pope is in Rome. 
The French-Canadians don't want to go to war ... if war 
happens - and the possibility it may seems more 
probable every day - and Italy is in on one side and 
England on the other, the sympathy of the French- 
Canadians in Quebec will be on the side of Italy. We 
French-Canadians are not Latins, but Normans, but we 
have become Latinized over a long period of years. The 
Canadians are Fascists by blood, but not by name.58 
Both government and censor had over-estimated the potential 
effect of Houde's statement against registration. Like most 
Canadians, Quebeckers had been jolted by the military success of the 
Nazis in the early summer of 1940. Public opinion, as the prominent 
Quebec nationalisre Andre Laurendeau later remarked 'itait ~ r & t r e  h 
subir n'importe q ~ o i . ' ~ ~  The victory of the Quebec Liberal party in the 
provincial election of October 1939, and the Liberals' federal victory 
in March 1940 had strengthened King's hand in Quebec. Almost two 
months before Houde's defiance of the federal government, a motion 
condemning the federal Mobilization bill was defeated in the Quebec 
Assembly by a vote of 56 to 13. 60 The Roman Catholic hierarchy in 
Quebec supported the federal government's policy of registration, 
and the press was muted by censorship. It was small wonder that 
popular opposition had little chance to find its voice. In the summer 
of 1940, the feelings of many Quebeckers were those of ambivalence, 
rather than outright opposition to the government's war policy. 
Many, like Laurendeau, believed that they were betraying themselves 
by registering, but they went ahead anyway: the powers of the state 
were too great to be resisted by individuals, however morally justified 
they may have felt. Besides, the morrow of France's collapse was no 
fit time to resist regi~tration.~' 
The government miscalculated the effect of Houde's statement on 
the population of Quebec: the miscalculation was reflected in the 
censor's action on the night of 2 August and in the subsequent 
backtracking. As civil servants, the men who staffed the offices of the 
censorship had to support their political masters. Unlike most civil 
servants, however,the censors were in the direct line of fire from the 
newspapers. The criticism which would normally have been diverted 
at the cabinet minister responsible was diverted in large part to  the 
inviting target presented by the censors. The criticism was made 
more acerbic by the censors' erstwhile status as journalists 
committed to the free dissemination of fact and opinion. Putting it 
baldly, the censors' burned their fingers on the Houde issue. On the 
night of 2 August, they went beyond the limit of the small portion of 
authority they possessed. They were fumbling in the dark for a 
consistent policy of censorship in the face of the strongly-entrenched 
free press tradition of Canadian journalism at a time when, 
paradoxically, the newspapers were themselves placing limits on that 
tradition 'for the duration.' 
By ruling on the Houde statement before the newspapers 
submitted their stories on it, the censors ensured that they would 
incur the editorial wrath of the newspapers, whether or not the 
statement was actually subversive. They saw the issue in the same 
terms as their political superiors perceived it, and they tried to 
forestall its eruption as a cause c&bre in French Canada by first 
advising the suppression of news about Houde, then by warning 
the newspapers of the possible legal consequences of publishing such 
news. In the end, the news received more publicity than would have 
been the case had the censors not acted so precipitately. The censors 
initially failed to make the distinction between reporting the news 
and exploiting it, then backed away when the issue had received a 
parliamentary airing. As ex-journalists they should have known that 
once a news story receives a public airing, no power available to a 
democratic government can stop its spread. In the case of the 
Canadian press censorship, the Houde issue served as a salutary 
lesson in the limitations of censorship even in a society subject to the 
War Measures Act and the Defence of Canada Regulations. 
The position of the censor - forced to make quick judgement in 
the midst of fast-changing circumstances - was scarcely calculated 
to satisfy all interested parties, no matter how wise his decisions may 
have been. In a letter to the acting head of the Censorship Co- 
ordination Committee, the chief censor for English-language 
publications outlined his conception of the censor's role: 
Are the Press Censors 'in the middle', i.e., between the 
interests of security and the interests of morale? Perhaps 
'in the middle' is an awkward phrasing of it, because it 
may suggest that we have only a detached academic 
interest in security which is certainly not the case. Would 
it not perhaps be more accurate to say that it is our duty 
to interpret certain phrases of the Defence of Canada 
regulations, such as 'information of value to the 
enemy'? ... The Press Censor has to 'draw the line'. That is 
really what I mean by being 'in the middle'. But 'drawing 
the line' involves weighing considerations. Practically 
everything printed has some small theoretical value to the 
enemy. This value must be weighed against the value to 
Canada and to the war effort of allowing it t o  be 
published. In other words, the Press Censors in making 
any ruling must attempt to weigh security against other 
 intangible^.^^ 
It was not until two years after the Houde incident that the censor 
received a clear definition of his powers under the DOCR, in 
Regulation 63A.63 In addition to the new regulation, the censor 
secured an agreement from the department of justice that no 
newspaper would be prosecuted for reporting in good faith a 
subversive statement made in public, provided the statement was 
neither supported nor exploited.64 
If the censor's action in the Houde case aroused the newspapers to 
a realization of the DOCR's potential power over them, such a 
realization was rarely expressed with any vigour in their pages. There 
was no sustained press campaign against censorship or against the 
loss of civil liberties generally.65 Certainly, there were outbursts of 
editorial indignation against the censor as the war continued, but 
these outbursts were occasioned by specific incidents, not by moral 
or philosophical reservations about censorship in itself.66 The role of 
constant critic of the the DOCR and censorship remained with the 
small-circulation 'intellectual' periodicals, and even their criticism 
was often less than ~holehearted.~' 
Like the correspondents in the war zones, editors and reporters in 
Canada generally shared in the war aims of the Allied Powers and 
were willing to make accommodation with the exigencies of wartime 
conditions, even when such exigencies included limitations of 
freedom of e x p r e s s i ~ n . ~ ~  The press in Canada reported on, and 
reflected the world around it. If the public was willing to put up with 
restrictions on civil liberties during time of war, the press was little 
inclined to get ahead of its readers. 
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